We compare two types of expressions that have been claimed to exhibit perspective-sensitivity in their semantics, predicates of personal taste like, e.g.,
Perspective sensitivity is a ubiquitous linguistic phenomenon. We use perspective sensitive items like
Since the main aim of this contribution is to present the experimental evidence, our theoretical discussion cannot make any claim to an exhaustive representation of the vast and complex linguistic and philosophical issues surrounding PPTs; for an overview and in-depth discussion of both the semantic and the philosophical matters involved, we refer the reader to Peter Lasersohn’s recent book (
The two types of expressions to be investigated in this contribution are exemplified by the English examples below.
(1) | C |
Haggis is |
(2) | M |
Carla is sitting |
In (1), the underlined expression is a predicate of personal taste. It expresses the judgment of the speaker, Craig, about his attitude towards a type of food, haggis: he considers it tasty. That this is a ‘personal’ judgment is quite obvious, since other persons will have other attitudes towards haggis, and will express them accordingly, perhaps using other types of PPTs like
In (2), a location—where Carla is sitting—is described in relation to another location, the location of Michael. The relation expressed in (2) is
From this first approximation, it may seem that the two types of expressions are quite different in their usage, and in the semantics that underlies this usage. However, they exhibit a fair amount of commonalities, that we will go into, before returning to their—more or less—obvious differences.
The first and most obvious commonality between the two types of predication to be investigated here is that both predicates of personal taste, as well as relational locative expressions, exemplified in (3) and (4) below, are
(3) | Carla is sitting to my left. |
(4) | I find haggis to be quite tasty. |
To assess the truth of (3), we have to check whether the person uttering (3) is located such that Carla is sitting to her left. And to assess the truth of (4), we make sure that the person who uttered it does indeed consider haggis tasty. The context dependence here is obviously tied to the indexicals
(5)
Carla
Carla
sitzt
sits
links.
left.
(6)
Haggis
Haggis
ist
is
lecker.
tasty.
What these examples show is that both types of PSEs contain what may pre-theoretically be called “slots” for the expression of relational information, and that these slots can be filled by indexicals (as in (3) and (4) above), or can be left implicit (as in (5) and (6)). In both cases, one would probably want both types of expressions to contain
The property to provide a variable is the third commonality that the two types of expression exhibit. As one would expect in connection with the third property, there are restrictions on the types of values that the variable might take on. Lasersohn (
While we will not provide a compositional analysis for the interpretation of the two types of expressions, we can use this formal system to illustrate the assignment of different values to the variables contained in PPTs and RLEs. Assuming the usual semantics for predication (see
(7) | C |
Haggis is tasty. |
comes out, preliminary, as
(8) | ⟦ |
Since the denotation ⟦
(9) | M |
Haggis is tasty for Craig. |
has the contextual parameters
(10) | Everyone likes haggis. |
Rather than assigning no value to the judge parameter, the judges covary with the individuals that the assignment function passes to the interpretation of the quantifier; see Mitchell (
Although Lasersohn (
(11)
M
Carla
Carla
sitzt
sits
links.
left.
the denotation ⟦
(12) | ⟦ |
Thus, the sentence comes out as true if Michael utters it in a situation where Carla is sitting to his (intrinsic) left, and false otherwise. The interpretation seems to be fully parallel to the one in (8).
Given the commonalities between the two expressions, and the successful application of the same interpretation rule to the
(13)
C
Carla
Carla
sitzt
sits
links
left
von
of
Michael.
Michael.
At first glance, it seems that the evaluation index
(14) | ⟦ |
Apparently, just as in the case of PPTs with an overt judge, the overt expression of the spatial relatum blocks the assignment of the agent of (13) to the “judge” parameter, which in this case should probably more aptly be called “perspective parameter”. But are the truth conditions in (14) really correct? Let us consider a few scenarios that should make (13) true if (14) is the correct rendering of the truth conditions. In Scenario 1, Carla is sitting to the left of Michael, and Craig is standing behind them, aligned with Michael (Carla’s orientation is of course irrelevant). This is a scenario in which (13) comes out as true, as readers may verify for themselves.
There is, obviously, a different scenario, Scenario 2, in which the speaker, Craig, is not aligned with the relatum, Michael, but rather is standing opposite of him, facing him.
In Scenario 2, there is a reading under which (13) comes out as true, and one where it comes out as false: for the first reading, we assume that the perspective parameter gets filled by Michael; the interpretation then proceeds as in (14), and the sentence comes out as true. For this first reading, we have to suppose that Craig is taking on Michael’s perspective in uttering (13). However, the second reading is one where the perspective parameter is filled by the speaker, Craig; and this gives us a denotation for (13) that is not true in Scenario 2:
(15) | ⟦ |
This deictic reading for
Hence, we have to rethink our strategy of parallelising the truth conditions we assign to PPTs and RLEs, despite the commonalities enumerated above: as we have surmised right from the start, one can expect there to be differences between the two types of expressions. Let us look at these in more detail.
The first, and most perspicuous, difference between the two types of expressions is that in many languages, including English, the encoding of the judge parameter of PPTs is optional, while that of the perspective parameter of RLEs seems to be mandatory. Although underlyingly both expressions seem to be relational and sensitive to context, and especially to the role that the speaker plays in filling the parameter, there are syntactic differences. This has been pointed out by Barbara Partee already (see
The second difference has to do with the possibility to block the assignment of the speaker to the judge/perspective parameter, or shift it away to a different referent, which we have discussed above with respect to example (13), and which we illustrate below in a somewhat different setting: embedding under attitude verbs.
(16)
a.
M
Craig
Craig
glaubt,
believes,
dass
that
Haggis
haggis
lecker
tasty
ist.
is.
b.
M
Craig
Craig
glaubt,
believes,
dass
that
Carla
Carla
links
left
sitzt.
sits.
In (16-a), the only possible assignment to the judge parameter of
A third difference, and one that has been the subject of much discussion is the proneness to so-called
(17) | C |
This vegetarian haggis is tasty. |
M |
No, it isn’t. |
(18) | C |
This vegetarian haggis contains cauliflower. |
M |
No, it doesn’t. |
Evidently, the disagreement between Craig and Michael in (17) is of a different kind than that in (18). To witness: the disagreement in (18) can be settled by checking—by some appropriate analytic procedure—whether the vegetarian haggis in question contains cauliflower or not. If it does, Craig is right, and Michael is wrong, and if it does not, the other way round. For (17), there does not seem to exist an equivalent procedure of assessing who is right, and who is wrong. Actually, there does not even seem to be something to be right or wrong
A fourth point where the two types of predicates diverge is the possibility to use RLE in a derived fashion, where the
(19) | a. | The ball is in front of the car. |
b. | The ball is behind the car. |
Such cases of a
A further difference between the two expression types lies in their event semantic properties: while PPTs can be used to express habitual judgments as in
Finally, the root of the differences enumerated so far, probably lies in the ontological differences between “judges” and “perspectives”, that is, the values that get assigned to the parameters of PPTs and RLEs, respectively. A judge has to be a sentient being, perhaps even a sentient being capable of expressing a judgment (though that is not entirely clear), and the perceptions of this sentient being have to be (mentally) represented on a scale: in order to be able to find something tasty, one has to have a comparison class, i.e. a set of objects with a (partial) ordering relation defined over that set. In comparison, a perspective is an object of an ontologically quite different kind: in the simplest case, it can be defined by two locations and a vector (e.g., in a Euclidian space); or a geometric point, and a projection (see
(20)
a.
*Peter
Peter
sitzt
sits
linker
left-
als
as
Paul.
Paul.
b.
*Peter
Peter
sitzt
sits
am
at-the
linkesten.
leftest.
This contrasts with the perfectly acceptable comparative and superlative usages of PPTs:
(21)
a.
Pudding
Pudding
ist
is
leckerer
tastier
als
as
Presssack.
Presssack.
b.
Pudding
Pudding
ist
is
am
at-the
leckersten.
tastiest.
To sum up: despite the initial prospects of providing a uniform semantic treatment for the two types of expressions, and despite some apparent semantic similarities, we have found them to differ in quite crucial respects. This raises the question whether the class of perspective-sensitive expressions is as uniform as one would consider it to be at first glance. In addition, we want to raise the question whether the two types of expressions can be shown to be interpreted differently in actual comprehension; if they can, this would be evidence against their uniformity.
In order to answer this question and to establish whether the apparent semantic and pragmatic differences discussed above can be made visible by quantitative data from actual linguistic behavior, we designed an experiment in which participants had to decide which of two boxes is the one that a protagonist in a given scenario would choose. The scenarios were described linguistically, and additionally by means of a schematic picture representing the scenario from a bird’s eye view. We chose to address the research question in this somewhat indirect manner, since previous studies used a rather blunt approach to assess the perspectivized interpretation of participants by asking them directly from whose perspective a certain expression was to be evaluated (e.g., see Harris and Potts (
By directly comparing two quite different types of PSEs in the same experimental setting, we hoped to accrue some evidence pertaining to the question as to whether the commonalities, or the differences between the two expression classes play a more important role. Since from all the differences described above in the section on the differences, the difference in embedding (see (16)) is the one that seemed to us the easiest to operationalise in an experiment, we chose to cross the factor P
We tested 40 speakers of American English over 18 years of age, 19 of which identified as female, 20 as male, and one which did not identify as female or male.
One item consisted of a linguistic description of the scenario, a pictorial representation of the decision situation, and a decision prompt; this structure was common to both experimental items and fillers. Also common was the depicted and described situation: two protagonists are involved in a box-picking game at a table. On the picture belonging to each picture, the participants saw the two protagonists seated opposite each other, with a table between them, on which the boxes are either placed on the line between the two, or perpendicularly. In the exact middle between the two boxes there is a flower, serving the role of a non-oriented relatum object (the depiction of the flower was centrosymmetric). Both protagonists are depicted schematically and symmetric to the horizontal axis of the picture, and they are named.
The RLE items had a relatively simple structure: there was a context sentence (above the scenario picture in Figure
First scenario: Michael and Craig are aligned.
Second scenario: Michael and Craig are facing each other.
Sample stimulus in the RLE/–embedded condition.
The RLEs employed in our materials were
Sample stimulus in the PPT/+embedded condition.
The 12 items thus consisted of 12 pairs of PPTs, each pair consisting of a predicate with a positive valence (e.g.,
Thus, depending on the condition of the item, either the position (RLE), or the surface of the boxes would vary. There were 24 items overall: 12 PPTs, and 12 RLEs. Within these, there were six +embedded, and six –embedded items, respectively. In addition, we varied, and counterbalanced, as far as that was possible, a number of further variables: (i) the box-taking verb (rotating through the verbs
In addition to the 24 experimental items, there were 24 filler items, four of which served as benchmarking items. The fillers had linguistic descriptions like
The experiment was administered via Amazon Mechanical Turk. First, participants were informed about their rights, and the setup of the experiment was explained, and a few sociographic variables were collected. Participants were then given two sample items to familiarise themselves with the task. Then the experiment with the 48 trials would start.
By nesting the factor E
Hazel will select the fascinating box. | |
Lexie thinks that Hazel will select the fascinating box. | |
Heather will select the box in front of the flower. | |
Shannon thinks that Hazel will select the box in front of the flower. | |
The factor
Firstly, we predicted a main effect of the factor E
Based on our theoretical considerations, we further predicted an interaction of the factors E
As our dependent variable, we defined the proportion of decisions for the box-taker box, that is, the box that corresponds to the intrinsic/perspectivised reading of the RLE/PPT from the viewpoint of the protagonist who gets to pick the box in the scenario. For example, in the scenario depicted in (3), this would be Box
Mean Proportion of Shift Towards the Box-Taker Perspective, dependent on E
As is evident from Figure
In order to assess the reliability of these effects, we performed a linear mixed-effects logistic regression on the decisions, with E
Our prediction that there should be a main effect of embedding is clearly borne out by the data, and the model comparison for that factor yielded a significant effect for E
Output of the maximal (converging) model.
Fixed effects | Estimate | Std.Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
---|---|---|---|---|
(Intercept) | –0.03149 | 0.32049 | –0.098 | 0.9217 |
PSERLE | –0.77262 | 0.33422 | –2.312 | 0.0208* |
EMB-emb | 3.00036 | 0.42416 | 7.074 | 1.51e-12*** |
PSERLE:EMB-emb | –0.30710 | 0.53947 | –0.569 | 0.5692 |
As Figure
Mean Proportion of Shift Towards the Box-Taker Perspective for the PPTs only, dependent on E
The results we obtained were not particularly clear with respect to the hypotheses we started out with: whether or not there is a clear difference between predicates of personal taste and relational locatives seems to depend on details of the statistical analysis—not a very desirable state of affairs. Still, we think that, taken together with the theoretical considerations pursued in the section on commonalities and differences, it is possible to argue that the emerging picture is not so unclear after all. In order to integrate the experimental results into our theoretical background, we will shortly review the commonalities and differences that we found the two types of PSEs, PPTs and RLEs, to exhibit.
The
The
Also, the striking similarities in the two interactions between E
First of all, the similarity between the two types of expressions is partly due to the choice of our experimental design. Although in everyday situations, people sometimes face each other, and then person
Still, one may wonder whether these design restrictions alone explain the similar patterns, or whether there is some deeper reason why the valency of PPTs and the orientation of RLEs behaved so similarly in our experiment. Our take on the somewhat surprising similarity in the interaction patterns is that both taste predications with positive valency, and
Thus, with the exception of this one data point, we think we are able to explain how the observed similarities came about. We furthermore think that the differences—both empirical, and theoretical—persist in the face of the similarities: it should be quite hard, for example, to explain away the ontological differences of the parameter values we have pointed out. And even on a more basic level, the denotations of the two types of expressions, the differences are quite apparent: while an RLE denotes a relation between two sets of points in space, relative to an origo/perspectival center and a time of evaluation, a PPT denotes a mental object of at least ordinal scalar type, possibly with a standard, i.e. a threshold value, relative to an origo/judge and a time of evaluation. While the denotation of RLEs thus can be given extensionally, this does not hold for PPTs. We think that this very basic difference alone militates against a uniform treatment of the two types of PSEs, and calls for a semantic treatment of the class of perspective sensitive expressions that, while taking into account their commonalities, does justice to their differences.
Given the very preliminary nature of our results, it seems redundant to point to the need for more empirical work on the issues dealt with. We will only point to some directions for further research here.
We are currently working on a replication of the experiment described here in German, where RLEs can express the origo parameter as an adjunct, which is not possible in English (see Hörnig, Weskott, Kliegl, and Fanselow (
(22)
C
Carla
Carla
sitzt
sits
von
from
Michael
Michael
aus
off
links.
left.
Note that (22) is, thanks to its explicit expression of the origo parameter, true both in Scenario 1 (cf. Figure
Further experimental work needs to be done with respect to the preferences that the assignment of judge and origo parameters exhibits in online comprehension. We have started to look into this in counterfactual contexts (see Footnote 3), but this is only a first step, and there are intensional contexts—imaginations, dreams, etc.—where the interpretation of perspectival parameters behaves in fascinating and unexpected ways.
To conclude on a more general note: we have argued here that the differences found between two members of the class of perspective sensitive items, predicates of personal taste, and relational locative expressions, may outweigh the similarities they exhibit at a first glance. Given the differences, one may very well ask why the two types of expressions came to be treated as members of the same class in the first place. We think that this is an instance of a more general cognitive pattern. Spatial relational expressions tend to get mixed up with other types of relational and/or indexical expressions for two reasons: firstly, they are context dependent, which may be the reason why they get thrown into the same bag as other relational context dependent expressions. The second reason, however, is probably more important. We humans tend to think about many abstract relations in spatial terms; linguists studying metaphor have long recognized and described this. The application of the notion of perspective to mental representations seems a particularly prolific case: though this notion is firmly grounded in an extensional denotation in Euclidean space, it is, with increasing degree of metaphoricity, extended to conceptualise relational notions concerning temporal, epistemic, and intentional relations more generally. A case of particular significance is the notional environment of egocentricity, i.e. the
We decided to choose German here because the RLE examples without overt mention of the origo have a somewhat dubious grammaticality status in English (some native speakers accepting them, but some others not), while being quite OK in German. As the gloss for example (5) shows, the origo of the RLE does not have to be interpreted as necessarily to be that of the speaker.
Part of the formal apparatus Lasersohn employs in the 2009 paper is superseded by the more elaborate, pragmaticised theory in his 2017 book. But we take it that the semantic issues we are interested in here are not affected by the differences between these two formalizations, and that both the commonalities and the differences between the types of expressions come out the same in the 2017 version.
Probably closely related to the difference in embedding under attitudes is the difference in the behavior in counteridenticals; cf.:
(i)
a.
If I were Craig, Carla would sit to my left.
b.
#If I were Craig, haggis would be tasty.
This seems to add to the evidence that the perspective parameter of RLEs is readily shiftable, while the judge parameter of PPTs is less so; see Klages, Holler, Kaiser and Weskott (
One reason for being a bit sceptical about the term “faultless disagreement” is that the faultlessness of disagreement does not seem to be limited to predicates of taste, or, more generally, statements of “an opinion”. Kracht and Klein (
Also, one might wonder whether the term ‘disagreement’ is well chosen: the currently championed relativist treatments of cases of faultless disagreement seem to us to imply that there cannot be agreement about matters of taste, and it seems somewhat dubious whether there can be disagreement, faultless or not, about matters where there can be no agreement. Luckily, these critical considerations are completely orthogonal to the aims of the current paper.
A reviewer noted that statements containing RLEs can also describe habitual judgments, as e.g. in
The property of borrowing from the spatial domain is shared by many other of the thought experiments that Perry, Lewis, and others in their wake have brought up to argue for (or against) the particular properties of egocentric beliefs and utterances; see Cappelen and Dever (
“What happens when [Adam] believes a proposition, say the proposition that cyanoacrylate glue dissolves in acetone? Answer: he locates himself in a region of logical space.” (p.518, our emphasis)
This publication is based on Chapter 5 of the first author’s dissertation, Klages (
The authors have no competing interests to declare.